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Prof. Dr. Stefan Voigt

## Reading List for

### Public Law & Economics I: Public Choice and Public Regulation

Before we turn to the economic analysis of regulation proper, we set out to learn something about the political process and the actors involved in it. Only if we understand their incentives will it be possible to understand the regulation we observe in the real world. The first part – the one on the actors and their incentives – draws on the economic theory of politics which is also called *Public Choice*. The standard textbook in this area is Dennis C. Mueller (2003). *Public Choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The book is 700 pages strong. In other words: we only deal with the absolute highlights in class.

If you are interested in surveys on the respective topics, you might want to turn to:

Dennis C. Mueller (ed.): *Perspectives on Public Choice - A Handbook*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 contains survey papers on the most relevant areas of public choice written by 25 authorities in the field.

Should you be interested in having a look at some of the original papers, you can, of course, consult them directly. Many of them are also assembled in

Charles K. Rowley (1993). *The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 24*. It is a three-volume set that appeared with E. Elgar (Aldershot).

The second part of the class deals with regulation proper. A standard introductory textbook is

Kip Viscusi, Joe Harrington and John Vernon (2005); *Economics of Regulation and Antitrust*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

If you were prefer one written by a scholar in Law & Economics, you might want to turn to

Anthony Ogus (2004); *Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory*, Hart Publ.

A couple of years back, Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de Geest edited the *Encyclopedia of Law & Economics*. The entire encyclopedia is online and contributions can be downloaded free of charge. There are a number of entries dealing with issues of economic regulation.

Ch. 1: [Introduction](#)

Required reading: Den Hertog, Johan (1999); General Theories of Regulation, in: B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest (eds.): *Encyclopedia of Law & Economics*, downloadable at: <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5000book.pdf>.

Ch. 2: Getting Started: Justifying Regulation from an economic point of view

Required reading: Dennis C. Mueller (2003); *Public Choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chp. 2: The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency, pp. 9ff.

Ch. 3: Applications

Required readings: Dennis C. Mueller (2003); *Public Choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chp. 15: Rent seeking, pp. 333-335 and 343-358

Dennis C. Mueller (2003); *Public Choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chp. 16: Bureaucracy, pp. 359 – 385.

Ch. 4: More Applications

Required readings: Dennis C. Mueller (2003); *Public Choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chp. 19: Political competition and macroeconomic performance, pp. 429 – 459.

Dennis C. Mueller (2003); *Public Choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chp. 20: Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying, pp. 472-500

Dennis C. Mueller (2003); *Public Choice III*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chp. 14: The paradox of voting, pp. 303 – 332.

Surveys: 14, 16, 17 und 18 in the *Perspectives*.

Ch.5: Economic Arguments in Favor of Regulation

A good overview is: Hertog, Johan den (2000); General Theories of Regulation, in: Bouckaert, B. and G. de Geest (eds.): Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, downloadable free of charge via: <http://users.ugent.be/~gdegeest/5000book.pdf>.

A good overview of public utilities (and their regulation) is: Geddes, R. (2000); Public Utilities, in: Bouckaert, B. and G. de Geest (eds.): Encyclopedia of Law

and Economics, downloadable free of charge via:  
<http://users.ugent.be/~gdegeest/5940book.pdf>.

Ch.6: Cost-Benefit Analysis

Campbell, Harry and Richard Brown (2003). Chapter 1 (Introduction and Overview) from *Benefit-Cost Analysis*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-17.

Viscusi, Kip (2008). How to Value a Life. *Journal of Economics and Finance* 32(4): 311-323.

If you are interested in some background discussion, you might want to turn to the following:

Matthew Adler and Eric Posner (2001). *Cost-Benefit Analysis – Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

There are many very good introductions to C-B-A. The following one is definitely among them:

Boardman, Anthony, David Greenberg, Aidin Vining and David Weimer (2010). *Cost-Benefit Analysis*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition. Pearson Series in Economics.

Ch. 7: Assessing the Effects of Regulation

Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer (2002); The Regulation of Entry, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(1):1-37.

A good critique of Djankov et al. is: Arruñada, Benito (2007); Pitfalls To Avoid When Measuring Institutions: Is Doing Business Damaging Business? *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 35(4):729-747.

The argument that the general level of trust has a bearing on the demand for regulation is developed in two recent papers:

Aghion, Ph., Y. Algan, P. Cahuc, A. Shleifer (2009); Regulation and Distrust, available at: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1324264](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324264).

Pinotti, P. (2009); Trust and Regulations – Addressing a Cultural Bias; available at:  
[http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td09/td721\\_09/td\\_721\\_09/en\\_tema\\_721.pdf](http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td09/td721_09/td_721_09/en_tema_721.pdf).

Ch. 8: Behavioral Economics - A New Justification for Regulation?

Thaler, R. and C. Sunstein (2003); Liberal Paternalism. *American Economic Review* 93(2):175-179 (an extended version of that paper can be found in

**European Master  
in Law and Economics**  
University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law

Course: **Competition Law and Economics**  
**Prof. Dr. Thomas Eger**  
**First Winter Term (2016)**

**Working Material**

M. Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice, Cambridge 2004, excerpts from chapters 5 and 7.

R. S. Pindyck/D. L. Rubinfeld: Microeconomics, fourth edition, New Jersey 1998, excerpts from chapters 10, 12, 13.

D. Harbord/T. Hoehn: Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition Policy, in: International Review of Law and Economics, 14 (1994).

Articles 101 – 109 TFEU

Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 (Summary)

Council Regulation No. 139/2004 (Summary)



## Concepts & Methods

– Academic Year 2016/17 –

Franziska Weber

### *Syllabus*

#### Course Goal:

**In essence this course will provide you with the tools to carry out your own basic economic analysis of a legal provision!**

#### Course Description:

More concretely, this course offers an introduction to the basic concepts and methods of law and economics.

Economics, whose subject is the implications of rational choice, is an essential tool for figuring out the effects of law. An economic analysis of law comprises two related enterprises. The first enterprise is positive. It focuses on providing an economic explanation for the rules and institutions we have. The second enterprise is normative and examines how the law can be improved to coincide more with the goal of economic efficiency.

After an introduction to the science of law and economics and the different methods applied (Lecture 1 and 2), the course is organized in a two-fold way:

1) The first part sketches basic economic concepts that can be used to understand a wide range of legal issues, among others: Coase theorem, positive and negative externalities, internalization, transaction costs, incentives, enforcing rights (property rules and liability rules), economics of risk allocation, principal-agent problem, adverse selection, moral hazard, bargaining in the shadow of the law, carrots versus sticks, cheapest cost avoider, (marginal) deterrence, enforcement costs, error costs, free riding, collective action problem, judgment proof problem, rules versus standards etc. etc.

2) The second part then applies the economic concepts to the analysis of core areas of law, such as property rights, family law, criminal law, law enforcement and punishment, litigation and settlement.



This is typically done within one single lecture!

The course is designed for both, economics and law students. For economics students, it is an interesting application of the economic way of thinking to selected real world legal problems and policy issues. Law students will learn to understand legal issues from an economic perspective with a focus on a clear understanding of the logic and underlying economic intuition rather than just the results. The economic approach to law provides a unified vision of the law, tying together diverse areas of law into a common theoretical structure.

### **Learning goals**

On satisfying the requirements for this course, students

- should obtain a general understanding of important l&e concepts and methods.
- should have the knowledge and skills to recognize the economic issues in a legal problem
- and apply the economic way of thinking to analyse it & make a comparative analysis of alternative legal arrangements with the help of the economic method

Obligatory reading materials will be available online before class.

Slides will be made available after each class.

**I look forward to meeting you!**

Franziska Weber



### 1. Introduction to L&E as a science

*Friday, 14<sup>th</sup> October 2016: 11.15 – 12.45*

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Paces/Visscher (2011), Methodology of Law and Economics (2011). Bart van Klink and Sanne Taekema (Eds.), Law and Method. Interdisciplinary research into Law (Series Politika, nr 4), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2011, sections 1-3 + 6
- ✓ Schäfer/Ott (2004), sections 1.1; 1.6-1.8; 3.3; 3.4; 3.6

### 2. Introduction to Methods

*Tuesday, 18<sup>th</sup> October 2016: 11.15 – 12.45*

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Siems, pp. 25-40, 41-58, 64-71
- ✓ Zweigert/Kötz, pp 63-73 (style of legal families)
- ✓ De Geest/Van den Bergh, Introduction (to Comparative Law and Economics), p. ix-xxi

„Out of interest“:

- ✓ Kadner Graziano, pp 7-24
- ✓ Zweigert/Kötz, pp 1-21 (introduction)
- ✓ Faust, Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of the Law, in Reimann and Zimmermann (eds): Oxford Handbook on Comparative Law, pp 837-865
- ✓ Siems (2014), Comparative Law, pp. 191-221(on legal transplants)

### 3. Comparative Efficiency of Legal Systems – Competition of Civil Justice Systems?

*Wednesday, 19<sup>th</sup> October 2016: 9.15 – 10.45*

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332
- ✓ Kramer (2013), Enforcing mass settlements in the European Judicial Area: EU policy and the strange case of Dutch collective settlements (WCAM), in Christopher Hodges and Astrid Stadler (eds.), Resolving Mass Disputes. ADR and Settlement of Mass Claims, Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, USA, 2013, pp. 63-90; **focus on:** 75-81





“Out of interest”:

- ✓ Wagner (2014), Adjudication as a Product: Competition in the Litigation Market, Buffalo Law Review, 62: pp. 1086;
- ✓ Mahoney (2001), The Common Law and Economic Growth

#### 4. Some classics: The Coase Theorem, Transaction Costs and Risk Allocation in L&E

Tuesday, 25<sup>th</sup> October 2016: **14 – 15.30!**

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-19
- ✓ Schäfer/Ott, pp 278-293

“Out of interest”:

- ✓ Vandenberghe/Visscher, The limits of freedom of contract: insights from law and economics, pp. 87-97, 112-113

#### 5. Thinking in terms of incentives: family law?

Wednesday, 26<sup>th</sup> October 2016: **11.15 – 12.45**

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L.Econ. & Org. 203 (1990)
- ✓ Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; or, “I Gave him the Best Years of My Life”, 16 Journal of Legal Studies 267-304 (1987)

„Out of interest“:

- ✓ Posner (2014), Family Law and Sex Law, Economic Analysis of Law, Chapter 5

#### 6. Markets and different shapes of regulation

***\*Hand in essay 1 by 1st November 2016 at noon & earn 0.5 bonus point!***

Wednesday, 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2016: **9.15 – 10.45**

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ **Landes and Posner (1978), the economics of baby shortage, 7 Journal of Legal Studies 323–48 (take this paper for your essay)**
- ✓ Ogus (2000): Encyclopedia entry on Self-regulation



- ✓ Weber (2013), pp. 189-193 on rules vs. standards

“Out of interest”:

- ✓ Ogus (1995) on Self-regulation *\*he has written a lot on regulation more generally*
- ✓ The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby (2006)

## 7. Rational criminals

*\*Hand in essay 2 by 8th November 2016 at noon & earn 0.5 bonus point!*

Wednesday, 9<sup>th</sup> November 2016: **9.15 – 10.45**

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ **Garoupa, Klick & Parisi, A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism, Public Choice (2006) 128:147–168 (take this paper for your essay)**
- ✓ Miles (2005), Empirical Economics and the Study of Punishment and Crime, University of Chicago Legal Forum 237-249
- ✓ Bowles, Faure & Garoupa (2008), The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Considerations, Journal of Law and Society, 35:3, 404-409
- ✓ Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 477-481

“Out of interest”:

- ✓ Becker (1968), Crime and Punishment: An economic approach, Journal of Political Economy, pp 169-217
- ✓ Klick, MacDonald & Stratmann, Mobile Phones and Crime Deterrence: An Underappreciated Link, first 6 pages+conclusion *\*part on empirical analysis voluntary*

## 8. Basic incentive problems in litigation I

Friday, 11<sup>th</sup> November 2016: **14.15 – 15.45**

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Weber (2015), Is ADR the Superior Mechanism for Consumer Contractual Disputes?—an Assessment of the Incentivizing Effects of the ADR Directive: 265-277 (8)

## 9. Basic incentive problems in litigation II

Monday, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2016: **9.15 – 10.45** *\*final double lecture*



Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Van den Bergh (2013), Private enforcement of European Competition Law and the persisting collective action problem, *Maastricht Journal*, pp 12-34 (8/9)
- ✓ Weber/Faure (2015), The Interplay between Public and Private Enforcement in European Private Law: Law & Economics Perspective, *European Review of Private Law*, 4: 525–550 (8/9)

“Out of interest” for I & II:

- ✓ Weber (2014) *The Law and Economics of Enforcing European Consumer Law*, Ashgate, Chapter 2-4
- ✓ Shavell (2003), *Economic Analysis of the general structure of the law*
- ✓ Becker (1968), *Crime and Punishment: An economic approach*, *Journal of Political Economy*, pp 169-217
- ✓ Ogus/Faure/Philipsen (2009), *Curbing Consumer Financial Losses - The economics of regulatory enforcement*, *Law & Policy*, 31:2, pp 161-191

## 10. Legal Harmonization, rounding up, exam preparation

Monday, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2016: 11.15 – 12.45 *\*final double lecture*

Obligatory reading:

- ✓ Visscher (2010), *A Law and Economics View on Harmonization of Procedural Law*

### & Further reading

- *Cooter/Ulen, Law and Economics*, 6th ed., 2016
- *Polinsky An Introduction To Law & Economics* 4th Edition, 2011.
- *Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed., 2014.
- *Schäfer/Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law*, 2004.
- *Shavell Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law*, 2004.
- *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*, available at: <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/> [new edition (partly) available, no online access]
- *Furubotn/Richter, Institutions & Economic Theory*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 2010. *\*Note: This volume includes a comprehensive L&E Glossary.*

**European Master  
in Law and Economics**  
University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law

Course: **Tort Law and Economics**  
**Prof. Dr. Thomas Eger**  
**First Winter Term (2016)**

**Working Materials**

- R. H. Coase: „The Problem of Social Cost“, (3) Journal of Law and Economics 1960.
- G. Calabresi/A. D. Melamed: „Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral“, (85) Harvard Law Review 1972.
- S. Shavell: „Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law“, Harvard University Press 2004, chapters 8 – 12.



1st Trimester, 2016–2017, University of Hamburg

## **Foundations of Law and Economics I: Microeconomics**

### **1. Objectives**

Economic analysis of law investigates legal rules and enforcement from an efficiency perspective. The main objective of this course is to equip students with a set of conceptual tools of microeconomics, which can be applied to different economic and regulatory problems.

### **2. Intended Learning Outcomes**

At the end of this course students should

- be familiar with a set of conceptual tools of microeconomics which are applicable to the analysis and design of different economic and regulatory problems.
- be able to apply those conceptual tools in their approach to other courses.

### **3. Pre-requisites**

None.

### **4. Teaching Staff Involved in this Course**

- Lectures: Prof Dr Frank Steffen (University of Bayreuth)  
E: frank-steffen@uni-bayreuth.de
- Tutorials: Stephan Michel (University of Hamburg)  
E: stephan.michel@ile-hamburg.de

### **5. Teaching and Learning Strategies**

This is a classical lecture course comprising 12 lectures (90 minutes), which are supported by 12 tutorials (90 minutes).

### **6. Lecture Programme**

1. *Preliminaries and the basics of the market* (P&R: 3–10, 21–27, 33–43)
  - Types of analysis
  - The market
  - Supply and demand
  - Elasticities
2. *Consumer behaviour* (P&R: 67–91, 95–96)
  - Preferences
  - The budget constraint
  - Choice and utility
3. *Individual and market demand* (P&R: 111–128, 132–143)
  - Individual demand
  - Substitution effects
  - Market demand
  - Consumer surplus
  - Network externalities

4. *Choice under Risk* (P&R: 159–170)
  - Describing risk
  - Preferences toward risk
  - Insurance
5. *The cost of production* (P&R: 201–210, 216–224, 229–260)
  - Production and Costs
  - Measuring Cost: Which Costs Matter?
  - Types of Costs
  - Cost Curves
6. *Profit maximization and competitive supply* (P&R: 279–312)
  - Perfectly Competitive Markets
  - Profit Maximization
  - Choosing Output
  - The Competitive Firm’s Supply Curve
  - Market Supply
7. *The analysis of competitive markets* (P&R: 317–339, 345–349)
  - Consumer and producer surplus
  - Efficiency
  - Regulation
8. *Market structure* (P&R: 357–382, 399–419, 456–464, 469–480)
  - Monopoly
  - Oligopoly
9. *Game theory* (P&R: 487–516, R: Chapter 1)
  - Games
  - Equilibria & solution concepts
  - Normal & extensive form games
  - Basic solution concepts
  - Repeated Games
10. *Asymmetric information* (P&R: 631–656)
  - Quality uncertainty and adverse selection
  - Moral hazard
  - Signaling
  - Principal-agent problem
11. *Externalities* (P&R: 661–678)
  - Externalities
  - Correcting market failure
12. *Fundamentals of welfare economics* (B: 279–281, F&S: 195–216, J: 1–6, 10–11, 22–35, 39, 147–152 [optional reading], N: 1–6, 6–16 [optional reading], P&R: 602–612, 625–626, R&P: 56)
  - Pareto optimality
  - Welfare criteria
  - Social welfare functions
  - Arrow’s (im)possibility theorem

## 7. Assessment

The assessment of this course consists out of two components:

- 120 minutes unseen written examination (80% of the course grade)
- Tutorial work (20% of the course grade)

## 8. Literature

### 8.1 Required Core Reading

As the core reading students will be required to read parts of the following source:

- Pindyck, RS & Rubinfeld, DL (2012), *Microeconomics*, 8<sup>th</sup> edn. (P&R)

Note: Any earlier edition will be sufficient to follow the course.

### 8.2 Required Supplementary Reading

In addition to the core reading students will be required to read parts of the following sources:

- Backhouse, RE (2002), *The Penguin History of Economics* (B)
- Feldman, AM & Serrano, R (2006), *Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. (F&S)
- Johansson, P-O (1991), *An Introduction to Modern Welfare Economics* (J)
- Ng, Y-K (1983), *Welfare Economics* (N)
- Rasmusen, E (2005), *Games and Information* (R)
- Rowley, CK and Peacock, AT (1975), *Welfare Economics* (R&P)

### 8.3 Optional Supplementary Reading

In addition to the required reading students might find it helpful or informative to read selective parts of the following sources:

#### 8.3.1 Casual Introduction into Economic Thinking:

- Smith, D (2008), *Free Lunch: Easily Digestible Economics*

#### 8.3.2 Microeconomic Textbooks at an Introductory Level:

- Frank, RH et al. (2015) *Principles of Microeconomics*, 6<sup>th</sup> edn.
- Mankiw, NG & Taylor, MP (2014), *Microeconomics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn.
- Mankiw, NG & Taylor, MP (2014), *Economics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn. (This textbook contains the material of the textbook above, but contains also macroeconomic topics, which are not covered in this course.)
- Slowman, J et al. (2014) *Economics*, 9<sup>th</sup> edn.

#### 8.3.3 Microeconomic Study Aids at an Introductory Level:

- Olney, ML (2009) *Microeconomics as a Second Language*

#### 8.3.4 Alternative Microeconomic Textbooks at an Intermediate Level:

- Komlos, J (2014) *What Every Economics Student Needs to Know and Doesn't Get in the Usual Principles Text.*
- Frank, RH (2014) *Microeconomics and Behavior*, 9<sup>th</sup> edn.
- Nechyba, TJ (2011) *Microeconomics: An Intuitive Approach with Calculus*
- Varian, HR (2014), *Intermediate Microeconomics*, 9<sup>th</sup> edn.
- Varian, HR (2014), *Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus*

#### 8.3.5 Lecture Notes at an Advanced Level:

- Rubinstein, A (2012) *Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn.

#### 8.3.6 Introductory Textbooks Into Game Theory:

- Aliprantis, CD and Chakrabarti, SK (2012), *Games and Decision Making*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn.
- Carmichael, F (2005) *A Guide to Game Theory*
- Dixit, A et al. (2014) *Games of Strategy*, 4<sup>th</sup>,edn.
- Holler, MJ et al. (2016) *Einführung in die Spieltheorie*, 8<sup>th</sup> edn.
- Osborne, MJ and Rubinstein, A (1994) *A Course in Game Theory*
- Maschler, M et al. (2013) *Game Theory*
- Riechmann, T (2013) *Spieltheorie*, 4<sup>th</sup> edn.

**EMLE- University of Hamburg**  
**Introduction to Law**  
**Course outline**  
**Lecturer: Prof. Noah Vardi**

*Syllabus*

**Literature:**

J. Hage- B. Akkermans (eds.), *Introduction to Law*, Springer, 2014

Zweigert and Kotz, *An Introduction to Comparative Law*, transl. T. Weir, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Oxford University Press, 1998

F. Schauer, *Thinking Like a Lawyer. A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning*, Harvard University Press, 2009

Selected chapters from M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulaï (eds.), *The Past and Future of EU Law*, Hart Publishing 2010: (chapters 1 & 2)

Selected judgements of the European Court of Justice:

- Case C26/62 *Van Gend an Loos*
- Case 6/64 *Costa v. ENEL*
- Case C 106/77 *Simmenthal*
- Case C 617/10 *Åkerberg Fransson*
- Case C 399/11 *Melloni*

Other judgements:

Supreme Court of the United States, *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 US 137, (1803)

**Schedule:**

*DAY 1 - Date: TUESDAY 11.10*

*Hours: from 1 to 4 pm*

**Lecture 1: Introduction**

- System of the law
- Common law and civil law
- Overview of the course programme

**Lecture 2: Concepts of law**

- Concepts of law and sources of law
- Concepts of law and legal context



*DAY 2 -Date: WEDNESDAY 12.10*

*Hours: 1-4*

**Lecture 3:** Private law

- Subjects of private law
- Rationalities of private law
- Contract and tort

*DAY 3- Date: THURSDAY 13.10*

*Hours: from 10 to 12 pm + 1-3 pm*

(Private Law- continued if need be)

**Lecture 4:** Criminal law

- Subjects of criminal law
- Rationalities of criminal law
- Important concepts of substantive criminal law
- 

**Practicum 1 (assignment) :** Solving a simple private law case (will be assigned in class)

*DAY 4 - Date: TUESDAY 18.10*

*Hours: from 2 to 4 pm*

**Lecture 5:** Constitutional and administrative law

- Subjects of constitutional and administrative law
- Rationalities of constitutional and administrative law
- *Trias politica*: constitutional and administrative review

*DAY 5 -Date: WEDNESDAY 19.10*

*Hours: from 1 to 4 pm*

**Lecture 6:** The European Union multilevel legal order

- Fundamental principles of EU law
- The Rule of law in the EU

*DAY 6- Date: THURSDAY 20.10*

*Hours: from 9 to 12 pm + 1-3 pm*

**Lecture 7:** Administration of justice

- Elements of procedural law
- Fundamental principles of courts as institutions: independence and impartiality
- Fundamental principles of court procedures
  
- **Practicum 2 (in class): The EU and fundamental rights- 2 recent ECJ cases**

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**Final examination:**

-Written exam in November